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THEORY WARS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
Louise Weinberg*
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS:
TODAY AND TOMORROW. By

Symeon C. Symeonides.

Martinus Nuhoff Publishers. Forthcoming 2005.1

Leiden/Boston:

INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, at the height of modernism in all things, there was

a great revolution in American choice-of-law theory. You cannot

understand what is going on in the field of conflict of laws today

without coming to grips with this central fact. With this revolution, the

old formalistic way of choosing law was dethroned, and has occupied a
humble position on the sidelines ever since. Yet there has been no

lasting peace.The American conflicts revolution is still happening, and

poor results are still frustrating good intentions.

Now comes Dean Symeon Symeonides, 2 the author of the choice

of-law

code

of

Louisiana, 3 with

an

intriguing

American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts.
the field quite like it.

monograph,

The

There is nothing in

*
Holder of the Bates Chair and Professor of Law, University of Texas, J .D. 1969,
Harvard; B.A. 1964 Cornell. - Ed.

1 . THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION will be made more generally
available in a freestanding treatise edition in 2005. I am reviewing it here in a limited 2003
printing available only to libraries. This 2003 printing, in turn, is an unabridged offprint of
the same title published as volume 298 of the series RECUEIL DES COURS [Collected
Courses] (Hague Academy of International Law 2002).
2. Dean and Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. Dean
Symeonides has authored or edited fifteen books and some sixty articles in the fields of
comparative and American conflicts law.
3. See Book IV of Louisiana's Civil Code, 1991 La. Acts 923. Dean Symeonides has also
drafted a proposed choice-of-law code for Puerto Rico, presently before Puerto Rico's
legislature. He now chairs the committee drafting conflicts legislation for Oregon,
the contracts provisions of which have been enacted. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 81.100 to 81.135
(2003), and the torts provision of which is the subject of the committee's current work. See
Symeon C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law for Contracts: The Oregon Experience, 67
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 726
(2003); Symeon C. Symeonides, Private lntemational Law Codification in a Mixed
Jurisdiction: The Louisiana Experience, 57 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 460 (1993); Symeon c. Symeonides, Revising Puerto
Rico's Conflicts Law: A Preview, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 413 (1990).
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Symeonides has given us a brilliant contribution to legal theory, an

impressive, original, one-of-a-kind book, in which a good deal of
valuable empirical research is the subject of thoughtful analysis, and in

which the reader is offered, and sees in action, an original way of
thinking about how to fashion rules for choosing law.
No one else could have written this book. Symeonides speaks to us
personally on every page. Nor could it have been written by anyone

without

Symeonides'

intimate

familiarity

with current American

conflicts cases. Over a span of seventeen years he has given generously
of his time, as he still does, to the service, at once humble and
invaluable, of producing annual surveys of conflicts cases in American

courts.4 It was in this steady mining that he struck the mother-lode of

material that enriches this book. Symeonides has come through years

of work on his codifications of state conflicts rules, and through years

of commentary on American decisions in the lower courts, and has

emerged confident in his own outlook: conservative, traditional,
deferent to

the concerns of other

countries and the needs of

defendants, yet also humane about the needs of plaintiffs; writing with

conviction,

yet

reasonable

in

argument. To

all

of

this

Dean

Symeonides brings a formidable erudition. He is enviably conversant

with

emerging

European

as

well

as

American

theory,

debate,

problems, attempted solutions - and he reads his foreign sources in
the original languages. But if The American Conflicts Revolution is a
very personal book, often magnetic, a page-turner, it is because it is

the honest record of an inner struggle, the culminating and central

work of Symeonides' life.

In Part I below I set out an intellectual history of modem conflicts

theory and the controversies still plaguing it. This also serves to

introduce the reader to the power of modem choice-of-law analysis. In

Part II I take a brief look at the politics of the controversy. I note, in
Part III, a recent empirical turn in the literature, of which Symeonides'
work is a superior example. In Part IV, using interest-analytic
methods, I begin to dig into Symeonides' treatment of irrationality in

choices of law. I consider the advisability, in Part V, of a return to the

law of the forum for intractable cases, and, in Part VI, Symeonides'
view that forum law, and other features of modern methods, can
disserve the higher values of the law. Here I evaluate Symeonides'
analysis of a recent products case, Kelly v. Ford Motor Co. In Part VII,
I discuss Symeonides' reluctant subordination of the ideal of

4. See, most recently, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in
2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 9 (2004). There is no substitute for
these surveys. It should be noted that Symeonides' surveys are hardly bare reports. His
typology of the cases is very personal to him, and his commentary reflects the thinking which
has culminated in The American Conflicts Revolution. At the 1999 Annual Meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, its Section on Conflict of Laws passed a resolution of
appreciation for Symeonides' annual surveys project.
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substantive justice to the ideal of neutrality, which he holds in highest
esteem, and in Part VIII I argue that neutrality is a false value in the
context

in

which

Symeonides

struggles

to

maintain

it.

These

interesting differences in viewpoint do not, however, lessen my
admiration for this engrossing new book.
I.
A.

AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

The American Legal Realists

We can trace the intellectual history of the American conflicts

revolution along four overlapping tracks. The opening salvo was fired

in academia, when American legal realist writers of the 1920s and

1 930s began aiming some of their most penetrating critiques at the

field of conflict of laws. The realists deplored the sort of mechanical,
formalistic legal methods of which the

First Restatement of

1934 would

be the embarrassing embodiment.5 The realists tore the polite veil of

disinterestedness from the judicial process. They made us see that,
disingenuously or deludedly, judges only professed to be complying

with the command of inexorable bright-line rules. And choice-of-law
rules seemed very bright-line indeed: "The law of the place of injury

governs a tort." "The law of the place of contracting governs a

contract." The American legal realists revealed to us that behind the

curtain there was no magical wizard, no "mystic over-law,"6 no rules
cut in stone, but only a fallible human being - a judge trying to do the

right thing. Inevitably, judges were manipulating the seemingly fixed

rules to produce desired results, and in this way obscuring to
themselves and others the "inarticulate major premises" of their
decisions.7 Pre-realist commentators would (rightly) praise as a sound

application of law a result they deemed just, and condemn one they
deemed unjust; but in so doing they were replicating the

hidden

thinking that was deciding the cases.

Probably the most influential among the American legal realists

working with the example of choice-of-law method was Walter

Wheeler Cook.8 Cook argued that, whatever law a court said it was

choosing, however much a court seemed to be subordinating its own
law, a court always, in fact, applied its own local law and policy.

5. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
6. Cf. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 432 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
7. Cf Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 ( 1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting): "The
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major
premise."
8. See generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457 (1924).
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did

choose. Cook

from local law was as much an expression of

actual local policy as an

application

of local law. He saw that a

departure from the law of the forum on ostensible choice-of-law

grounds is really a change in the forum's substantive policy. He saw

how the change becomes apparent to the bench and bar in later cases,
as lawyers begin to argue that the supposed law of the forum has
become an inaccurate reflection of true forum policy - as evidenced

by the forum's recent departure from its own law. This was Cook's
"local law" theory.9

Cook came to such thinking by looking beyond the lifeless

abstractions of the traditional choice-of-law method to its results. He

saw that legal formalisms, unless manipulated instrumentally, are all

too likely to produce arbitrary and irrational decisions. The more

principled the application, the more arbitrary the result. Cook and the
other American legal realists disparaged the alleged virtues of

mechanical jurisprudence - neutrality, predictability, uniformity.
Their concern, rather, was with the flesh-and-blood men and women
for whom too often the casualty of abstraction is justice.
B.

The Supreme Court

We have to look to the Supreme Court for the second strand in

this intellectual history. In a series of otherwise uninteresting cases in
the 1930s, the Court began to test choices of law as it does today,

under the Due Process Clause. The question for the Court was
whether a particular choice of law was so arbitrary and irrational as to
deprive the parties of the process that is due. In the now-classic

Insurance Co. v. Dick,

Home

the Court held in 1 930, in an opinion by Justice

Brandeis, that the law of a state without any relevant connection with

a case could not rationally, and therefore could not constitutionally,
govern that case.10 To exercise lawmaking power, a state should have
some nexus, some physical

govern.

contact,

with the case its law is supposed to

As this idea developed, the Court began to see that a mere

physical contact, by itself, might not be sufficient. Rather, the fact of a

state's physical contact with a case was important only because it lay a

basis for a more salient question: Did the state, by virtue of its physical
contact with a case, have a

rational basis for the application of its law?
significant, for purposes of establishing

In other words, was the contact

constitutional power? Might the state's physical contact with a case

9. See David F. Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARV. L. REV. 822 (1950).
10. Horne Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). For the continuing controversy over Mr.
Dick's connections with the forum or lack thereof, see, e.g., Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Who Was
Dick? Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 37.
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reasonably be thought to give rise to some legitimate

interest

in

governing it? The place of injury seemed a significant contact in a tort

case. The place where the lawyers resided did not.11
Of course there are at least two putatively concerned states in
every conflicts case. The concern of each is suggested by some physical

contact between the case and the state. This being so, the Supreme
Court began to see that both states might have constitutional power.
For example, the law chosen in a multistate case of tort, when there
was a contractual relation between the parties, could be
of the place of injury

or

either the

law

the law of the place of contracting - as the

Court specifically held, by Justice Stone, in 1939.1 2 The foundation for

this insight had been laid in an earlier opinion, also by Justice Stone, 13

when, in 1935, the Supreme Court decided the watershed case of

Alaska Packers v. Industrial Accident Commission. 14
Packers, the Court began the long process of weaning the

In

Alaska

bar from its

conviction (still an article of faith with some lawyers today) that in a

two-state case, American courts are required by the Full Faith and

Credit Clause to defer to the law of the other state. In fact, there is

no

obligation of full faith and credit to a sister state's laws - as opposed
to a sister state's judgments 15 - and in Alaska Packers Justice Stone

11. But see Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961) (listing a lawyer's domicile
as among the "contacts" which, in the aggregate, were held to support a departure from
forum law).
12. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939) (Stone, J.).
13. For Justice Stone's contributions to the field of conflict of laws, see generally Paul A.
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946),
reprinted in PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 183 (1968).
14. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
15. Id. at 547. With a single modem exception not relevant here, it is only with respect
to state judgments that Congress has exercised its power, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, to require
full faith and credit. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1738: "And the said records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they
have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be
taken." Under this statute, the forum must give the same scope to a state judgment that the
judgment-rendering state would. See also § 1738(a) (requiring full faith and credit to custody
decrees). See also Marrese v. Arn. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985)
(O'Connor, J.) (requiring federal courts, even in federal-question cases, to measure the
scope of a state judgment as the judgment-rendering state would, at least in the first
instance. Only after ascertaining whether the state judgment, so construed, would conflict
with federal law should a federal court consider whether an exception should be made). The
modem statutory exception to the rule that full faith and credit applies only to judgments
appears in the Defense of Marriage Act, Act of Sept. 21, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1 10 Stat.
2419, codified in pertinent part at 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c). Disregarding the historical difference
between judgments and laws, Professor Maltz proposes that we view the problem of
recognition of sister-state judgments merely as a conflict of laws, specifically a conflict of
"procedural" rules. Earl M. Maltz, The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the First
Restatement: The Place of Baker v. General Motors Corp. in Choice of Law Theory, 73 TuL.
L. REV. 305 (1998). He argues that since procedure is traditionally governed by forum law,
forum law should govern the validity of a sister-state judgment. It is the least of this
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was at some pains to explain that there could be no such obligation. If

the obligation of full faith and credit attached to laws, we would have

what Stone called an "absurd" result. In cases in which the laws of two
states were in conflict, the forum would have to apply the laws of the
other state, but would be disabled from applying its own.16 Perhaps
Stone saw this result as "absurd" because it would obliterate the
common law of choice of law. Or perhaps it was absurd to him
because it would flout the will of the legislature at the forum in every
two-state case. Or perhaps because it would strip a court of power to
enforce the substantive law of its own state. I suspect, though, that

Justice Stone thought it "absurd" simply because of the oddity of the
crisscross arrangement, by which each of the two states would have to
rely on the

other

to furnish law for a case. I am reminded of the old

story, intended to be uplifting, of the villagers suddenly afflicted with a
malady of which the only symptom is stiff arms. Unable to feed

themselves, they are about to perish from starvation, when they are

saved by the inspired realization that they can feed each other.
Fortunately, after

Alaska Packers,

it has become clear that the

obligation of full faith and credit requires no such contortions. Full

faith and credit has to do with a sister state's judgments, not its laws.
in

The Court still has occasion to reiterate this lesson, as it did in 2003

Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt.11

There, Justice O'Connor, writing

for the Court, pointed out that the Court's body of precedent
"differentiates the credit owed to laws ... and to judgments."18 To be

sure, some constitutional conflicts cases are still argued under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. But the Supreme Court treats such cases
argued under the Due Process Clause. In

Hyatt,

as if

California's lawyers

did rely on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, possibly out of concern

that the state and its tax board might not be "persons" entitled to due

process of law.19 The

Hyatt

Court accordingly confined its opinion to

proposal's disadvantages that it would require repeal of the Act of 1790, supra. More
fundamentally, the proposal would deny full faith and credit to the sister-state judgment,
whittling it down or puffing it up to match the forum's ideas. This would be subversive of the
intention of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, to unite American courts, short of
nationalizing them, as a single juridical entity.
16. "A rigid and literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to
the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises,
the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its
own." A laska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547 (Stone, J.).
17. 538 U.S. 488 (2003).
18. Id. at 494.
19. I am indebted to Marty Lederman for pointing out that in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966), the Court stated, "The word 'person' in the context
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot, by any reasonable mode of
interpretation, be expanded to encompass the States of the Union, and to our knowledge
this has never been done by any court." It would indeed seem rather odd to construe the
"person" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as embracing a state, since the
Amendment protects persons against the state. Nevertheless it would seem at least equally
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the question California raised under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.

Nevertheless, the Court referred throughout to due process cases.

The innovative Supreme Court cases of the 1930s taught that in a

two-state case in tort, the law chosen did not

have to be the law of the
have to be the law of the
place of contracting - nor, indeed, any other single place. In cases
combining tort and contract elements, both places would have
place of injury, nor, in a contract case, did it

constitutional power. This liberating insight in interstate cases carried

over to the ordinary common-law sphere of the Court's own choice-of
law method in federal, transnational cases. Thus, in dealing with

international choices of law in admiralty, a later Supreme Court, in

Lauritzen v. Larsen,

as a matter of federal common law, jettisoned

tradition and enumerated

various

contacts between countries and a

case that might be significant for choice-of-law purposes.20 Today the

leading modern due process cases are Allstate Insurance
and

Phillips Petroleum Co.

Co. v. Hague21

v. Shutts.22 Under these cases the Court

requires that the law chosen to govern an issue be the law of a state

having sufficient "contacts" with an issue to generate state "interests"
in governance of that issue. These interests must be sufficient to

ensure that application of the chosen law will be neither "arbitrary"
nor "fundamentally unfair."23

For a deeper understanding we now need to turn to the third

strand in the story.

C.

The Advent of Interest Analysis

Nothing in the intellectual history of the American conflicts

revolution was of greater moment than the publication of a law review
article some still consider the greatest law review article ever written,
Brainerd Currie's

Married Women's Contracts.24

In the American

odd that a state as litigant should not be entitled to ordinary due process in either set of
courts. The remark in Katzenbach seems doubtful vis-a-vis the process due the litigating
state.
20. 345 U.S. 571, 581-93 (1953). Lauritzen, although a great advance for its time, is less
helpful today. It survives in admiralty.
21. 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981).
22. 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985), quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13
(1981).
23. Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13 (Brennan, J.): "[F]or a State's substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."
24. Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method,
25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958), reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 77 (1963).
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conflicts revolution, this would become the shot heard round the

world.

Currie began modestly enough by stating a case - a familiar
Millikin v. Pratt.25 In

American classic of the field, the 1873 case of

that case, Mr. Pratt of Massachusetts, trying to embark on a new
business venture involving goods shipped from Maine, prevailed on

his wife to guarantee his payments to his Maine supplier, the Milliken

company. Mr. Pratt, putting his wife's separate property at risk, posted
her complaisantly signed guarantee in a mailbox in Massachusetts.
Times were hard and Pratt's new venture went awry. When the Pratts

failed to pay, Milliken came down to Massachusetts to sue Mrs. Pratt
on her guarantee. The Pratts defended on the ground that, under the

law of Massachusetts in effect when Mrs. Pratt signed that piece of
paper (repealed shortly thereafter), married women had no capacity
to contract. Under the law of Maine, however, Mrs. Pratt's guarantee

was good. Maine had long ago disembarrassed itself of a rule denying
married women the capacity to contract.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts famously held for

the Maine creditor. Chief Justice Gray decided that the law of the

place of contracting must govern a contract case in its entirety, even

on the issue of capacity. He rejected the law of the domicile to govern
the capacity of its domiciliaries, although that was a standard choice at
the time. But where

was the place of contracting?

Gray manipulatively

identified the place of contracting as Maine, thus validating the

interstate agreement and holding Mrs. Pratt to her promise. In other
words, Massachusetts' highest court denied a Massachusetts resident
the protections of Massachusetts law, invalidating a Massachusetts

married woman's contract signed by her in Massachusetts, in order to

allow a nonresident creditor to collect.
Much has been written on all sides of this troubling but admired

case. Dispute

still

rages

between territorialists

and

modernists;

between equalizing feminists and protecting feminists; between those

who think

the

mailbox rule for formation of contracts should

determine the place of contracting for choice-of-law purposes and
those who do not see why it should; between those who think
Massachusetts' intervening repeal probably made the difference and

those who think, if so, the court was wrong to let it affect the case
retroactively; between proponents of

lex loci contractus;

lex domicilii

and proponents of

between advocates of the issue-by-issue approach26

25. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878) (holding that the law of the place of
contracting determines the validity of a contract even on the issue of capacity to contract, an
issue that had been supposed governed by the law of the domicile).
26. The rational breakdown of whole "cases" into "issues" - the technique of so-called
depei;age - was a somewhat later development, itself controversial, and one that occurred
only gradually in the interplay between courts and writers. Depei;age was at the heart of the
question presented by Milliken v. Pratt, since the capacity of a married woman to contract
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and advocates of one law for the whole case; and between champions

of forum law and defenders of interstate commerce. 27 But Currie had
bigger fish to fry.

The tack Currie took was simply to chart all sixteen possible

permutations of

Milliken v. Pratt

by allocating either to Maine or

Massachusetts each of the four main "contacts" in the case (Mrs.

Pratt's domicile, Milliken's place of incorporation, the place of trial,
and the

place of contracting).

He then charted

outcomes to be expected in all these possible Mi/likens

the traditional

-

outcomes, in

other words, under the law of the place of contracting. Then, in two
tables, Currie compared those outcomes with identifiable policies of

the concerned states. With these simple materials, building on the

great American legal realist writings in the field, and under the

influence, as he freely acknowledged, of the Supreme Court cases of

the 1930s, Currie showed us astonishing truths about conflicts cases,
things which had not previously been understood.

The Supreme Court had helped us to see that the law of a state

having no connection with a case was an irrational choice; and that the
law of the place of injury in a tort case, or of the place of contracting in

a contract case, were not necessarily the only rational choices.

Women's Contracts showed

Married

us that the laws of states with even those

traditional connections with a case were not necessarily rational

choices at all. The law of the place of contracting might not be

rationally applicable in a particular contract case. The law of the place
of injury might not be rationally applicable in a particular case of tort.
In other words, a state's physical contact with a case might not matter.
A state's contact with a case needed to be significant. It would not be

significant, Currie argued, unless the relevant policies and interests of

that state would be advanced by application of its actual law to the

actual facts of the particular case.

Devising a revolutionary mode of analysis, Currie was able

convincingly to determine the significance of a physical contact. Currie

called his new method "governmental interest analysis." He thought

this analysis implicit in the Supreme Court cases of the 1930s. Readers
familiar with constitutional litigation will also see the further analogy

between the interest analysis the Supreme Court uses in interstate

conflicts cases under the Due Process Clause and the interest analysis
the Court uses in substantive constitutional cases. In both settings, a

burden falls on one of the parties to show that the state has some

was arguably a question more appropriately addressed to her domicile than to the place of
contracting. In Milliken, Chief Justice Gray declined to break out the issue of capacity. This
had the effect of furthering his instrumentalist purpose of validating the interstate contract.
27. For my views on Milliken v. Pratt, see Louise Weinberg, A Structural Revision of the
Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J. 475, 494-96 (2000).
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laws

-

a

legitimate

(In constitutional cases warranting heightened

scrutiny of state action, the burden becomes one of showing a
compelling governmental interest, but the principle is the same.)
Interestingly, as in the conflicts cases, these burdens in the substantive

cases also trace to the 1930s, also to an opinion by Justice Stone. The

case, of course, was

Carolene Products.28

By trying to identify a legitimate governmental interest at the place

of contracting for each of his charted variants of

Milliken

v.

Pratt,

Currie demonstrated that the one physical contact between a state and
a lawsuit that courts took most seriously in choosing law - the place

of the underlying events - was a place that in a large fraction of

conflicts cases had no interest at all in having its law applied. Even

such interests as might rationally be attributable to the state of

transaction or occurrence were at best only very general. The obvious

implication of this demonstration was that a court's choice, for

example, of the law of the place of injury to govern a tort, however
conventional,

however

traditional,

however

reassuring,

however

hallowed by time and confident usage, was likely to be as irrational a
choice as the law of a state having nothing to do with the case at all.

This was a startling conclusion. How did interest analysis yield

such counterintuitive ideas? Concerning cases of personal injury, for

example, Currie reasoned that the interests of all states as potential
places of injury lay in maintaining safety. A state would tend to be
focused on deterring accidents and maintaining the safety of its

territory, having no interest in maintaining an unsafe territory.

Accidents are costly, calling on state resources for expenditures

exceeding those entailed in maintaining safety. A state would have a

general interest, therefore, in deterring torts within its borders.
Moreover, a state would not want to discourage commercial or other
visitors by maintaining unsafe conditions on its territory, and would
want to encourage such visitors by protecting them. The state,
therefore, would have general interests in compensating anyone
injured within its borders, residents and visitors alike. Only

if its law
was defendant-deterring or plaintiff-favoring, then, could the law of the
place of injury, qua place of injury, rationally apply in a case of
personal injuries. Of course legislatures do enact defendant-protecting
laws, and, of course, courts do fashion defendant-protecting rules. The

place of injury might well have general defendant-protecting law, or

28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (Stone, J.) (sustaining
an act of Congress regulating imitation milk on the ground that Congress need only have
some rational basis for enacting ordinary economic legislation); id. at 152 n.4 (reserving a
power of heightened scrutiny for cases of failure of the political process, violations of
fundamental rights, or discriminations against discrete and insular minorities). I argue the
link between governmental interest analysis and rational-basis review in Louise Weinberg,
Choice of Law and Minimal Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1982).
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specific enterprise-protecting law. And, of course, such law would

have its rational applications, exceptions to the state's more general
safety concerns. But those rational applications would be limited to
cases in which the place of injury was also the place where the

defendant resided, or where the enterprise was located or the relevant
acts were performed or relevant products were being made. In other

words, the state's interest in protecting tort defendants would not arise
from the fact that the injury occurred there, but rather from the fact
that the defendant was based there or conducting relevant activities
there.

Similarly, all states have general interests in maintaining the
validity of legitimate business transactions within their borders. A
place where an agreement is formed,29 assuming no other contact with
a case, can have no interest in discrediting the transaction unless it is a
violation of public policy. A state would tend, rather, to be focused on
encouraging business within its borders. The state, therefore, would

have a general interest in sustaining the validity of a contract formed
there, and thus in compensating any creditor who suffered a loss on

account of a breach of a contract formed there.

Only if its law was
validating or plaintiff-favoring (that is, creditor-favoring), then, could
the law of the place of contracting, qua place of contracting, rationally
apply in a case of breach. Of course, legislatures do enact debtor

protecting laws, and, of course, courts do fashion debtor-protecting
rules. The place of contracting might well have debtor-protecting,

contract-invalidating law. And, of course, such law would have its

rational applications, exceptions to the state's more general validating
concerns. But those rational applications would be limited to cases in
which the place of contracting was also a place relevant to such an

application, like the place where the debtor resided. In other words,
the state's interest in protecting contract defendants did not arise from

the fact that the contract was formed there, but rather from the fact
that the defendant was based there or conducting valuable activities
there.

Interest analysis is an imperishable contribution to the rational
application of law. Yet interest analysis, as Currie insisted, was only,
at bottom, ordinary statutory construction and ordinary interpreta

tion of case law. One learns in the first year of law school that law
has no application beyond the limits of its own likely purposes -

that rules have no force beyond the scope of the reasons for them.30

29. For the limited purposes of the present discussion, I have refrained from considering
the traditional alternative to the place of contracting, the place of performance.
30. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If
two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each."); Calder
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So lawyers tend to look for the reasons for a rule - to argue
purposively,

functionally.

But

somehow

lawyers

had

not

made

ordinary construction and interpretation a part of the choice-of-law

process. While lawyers, judges, and commentators were accustomed to

analyzing substantive issues by inquiring into the reason for a law,
they were also accustomed to rigid, territorial, formalistic

choices

of

law - choices made without regard to law's reason, based on fixed
traditional rules of the sort set down in the

First Restatement.

They

were not unaware of the realist critique of the traditional way of

choosing law, but it still seemed to them that, rational or not, the

traditional rules were better than a stab in the dark. However
manipulable the traditional rules were proving to be, at least they gave
the illusion of providing neutral, certain, predictable, and uniform
choices.

Married Women's Contracts

met this seductive thinking head

on. Currie knew that the supposedly fixed rules could be putty
in judicial hands. He doubted that the traditional rules were capable
of uniform application. But even supposing that they were, Currie
argued that the price of uniformity was too high.31 Under careful

interest analysis, Currie conclusively demonstrated that a principled

application of the old territorial rules would chronically thwart the
policy of one of the two states without advancing any policy of the
other.

Pressing on, Currie then demonstrated something even more

unexpected, something that could not have been understood without

interest analysis. Suddenly it was revealed to his astonished readers
that a large number of the possible

Mi/likens on the chart in which the

laws of the two states were in conflict were what Currie called "false

conflicts." In these cases, notwithstanding that the laws of the two

states did seem to conflict, only one of the two states was an
"interested" one. Only one of the two had law that could rationally

govern the particular situation. These were cases of false conflict
because only one of the two states had a dog in the fight. This
identification of false conflicts was a revelation, a major discovery.32

Currie topped this with another major discovery, equally obvious,

yet something we had not seen because we had not recognized false

conflicts before

Married Women's Contracts. The obvious solution of a
apply the law of the only interested state. This alone,

false conflict is to

Currie pointed out, would solve a large fraction of conflicts cases.

v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (Chase, J.) ("The nature, and ends of legislative power
will limit the exercise of it.").
·

31. Currie, Married Women's Contracts, supra note 24, at 101.
32. The mistaken belief persists that the technical term "false conflict" is intended to
describe cases in which there is no conflict because the laws of both concerned states are the
same. See, for a typical example, Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co., 44 P.3d 364, 373 (Kan.
2002) , as later edited citing Lucker Mfg. v. Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 813 (3d Cir. 1994).
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Today, regardless of the choice methods adopted, a fair number of
American courts try to identify and eliminate false conflicts to obviate
any necessity for a more complex choice-of-law process.
Using interest analysis, Currie also was able to identify "true

conflicts. " These were cases like the real

Milliken v. Pratt,

in which

each of the two states was an "interested" one, in the sense that either
state's laws could rationally (and constitutionally) apply. And in other

early work he would also identify the "unprovided-for case," the case
in which neither state has a legitimate governmental interest.33
Currie had shown how to identify and resolve false conflicts . But

his true conflicts and unprovided-for cases presented problems he
believed could not be solved. For both these intractable kinds of
conflicts he suggested as a default position that the forum fall back on

its own law. No doubt it helped, in reaching this conclusion for true
conflict cases, that

Alaska Packers

had held the forum to be under no

obligation of full faith and credit to apply the other state's law.

As for unprovided-for cases, the forum, having j urisdiction over the
case and the parties, would have sufficient administrative interest by

virtue of those facts to make its law available as residual law, a more

clearly constitutional choice, Currie thought, than a choice of the
other state's law.

D.

The State Courts

Meanwhile, concurrent with the interest-analysis revolution, there

was a fourth development in this intellectual history: the state courts
were jumping in. The courts began to contribute creatively to the

demolition of the past and to proposals for modern approaches. Chief

Judge

Stanley H. Fuld in New York

chased the chimera of a

discernible "center of gravity" of a case,34 and Chief Justice Roger

Traynor in California began to use analyses of the policies and
interests of the concerned states.35 Traynor brought a characteristic

accommodationist perspective to his conflicts cases. In cases of true
conflict, he typically wound up subordinating California's interests to

those of sister states, or of the interstate system itself, as
Massachusetts' Chief Justice Gray had famously done in Milliken v.

33. See Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958). Currie used the word "unprovided" without
the added "-for."
34. See Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1961); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d
99, 101 (N.Y. 1954).
35. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953) (en bane).
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['ratt.36 Eventually Traynor would propose an influential "comparative

impairment" model for resolution of true conflicts.37
II.

THE POLITICS OF CONFLICTS

Anticlimactically, now that the dust has settled, it appears that

modernism has not won out after all. Although Brainerd Currie's

work will always stand at some pinnacle of legal thought, in these
postmodern times the American conflicts revolution churns on

unendingly, like the war in George Orwell's 1984.

The Second Restatement, triumphantly displacing the
First Restatement in 1971,38 and now adopted in the great

discredited

majority of

American jurisdictions, has turned out to be a disappointment.39 To be
sure, the

Second Restatement

presents a somewhat progressive far;ade.

It appears to abandon the place of injury, the place of contracting, and

so forth, relying instead upon the place of "most significant contact."40
It is also true that its key overarching section affords courts an
opportunity to consider the policies and interests of the concerned

states.41

But it surrenders

specific

sections

much of this

ground in the specific

provisions it makes for different areas of substantive law. These
make

presumptive

choices

of

the

old,

rigid,

territorialist, formalistic rules. Dishearteningly, the law of the place of

injury still presumptively governs a tort; the law of the place of

contracting

still

presumptively

governs

a

contract.42

These

are

36. See, e.g. , Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (1961) (en bane). For my analysis of
Bernkrant, see Louise Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law, 35 MERCER L. REV. 595,
609-12 (1984).
37. See Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts:
An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577 (1980); William F. Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
39. On the vices and virtues of Restatement (Second), see, for example, Friedrich K.
Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L. J. 403 (2000); Symeon C. Symeonides,
The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1248 (1997); Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27; Russell J. Weintraub, "At
Least, To Do No Harm": Does the Second Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic
Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284 (1997); see also William L. Reynolds, The Silver Anniversary
of the Second Conflicts Restatement, 56 MD. L. REV. 1193 (1997).
40. Currie did not think it possible to rank-order contacts. To him, the word "most" in
the phrase "most significant contact" would have been puzzling. After one has read enough
cases, one has to agree with Currie on this. Courts leap to a conclusion about "the place of
most significant contact" by piling up "contacts," or by creative use of the all-purpose
judicial term, "We think."
41. The reference is to the list of general guidelines found in section 6 of Restatement
(Second).
42. For an intellectual history of Restatement (Second), reconstructing the likely
intentions of Willis Reese, its distinguished Reporter, see Weinberg, A Structural Revision,
supra note 27.
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presumed to be the places of "most significant contact," although by

now everyone who has read

Married Women's Contracts

knows that

these places are likely to be of no more significance, and probably less,

than the respective residences of the parties.

Meanwhile, modem conflicts theory has become ensnarled in

unending, heated debate between traditionalists and modernists, those

who favor rules and those who favor "approaches," and between the

vociferous critics of interest analysis and its defenders. There also

lingers a methodological debate over how to solve the problems

Currie was unable to solve. The courts went through a period of these

kinds of debate as well, but, j ust as the academic debate has not

produced a decisive triumph of reason, the judicial debate has not

produced a decisive triumph of justice. By now, most state courts, and
virtually all federal courts, have opted for the

Second Restatement,

with a predictably large quotient of arbitrary and unjust results.

To make matters worse, the contending academic factions have

become increasingly politicized. In conflicts of tort law, methods that
tend to yield plaintiff-favoring law are thought to be favored by
liberals, methods that tend to yield defendant-protecting law by

conservatives. Nobody likes to

say

this, but there it is. Choices that

yield forum law are considered parochial, and because the plaintiff

chooses the forum, choices of forum law are decried as plaintiff

oriented. Choices that extend comity to the (usually) defendant

favoring law of a sister state43 are considered illiberal, unjust, and
defense-oriented. Because traditional territorialist methods are at
least superficially "neutral," striking with even-handed ferocity now at

plaintiffs, now at defendants (and because, by nature, conservatives
are comfortable with things familiar), conservatives tend to favor
"rules." Liberals, on the other hand, are unnerved by the mere

contemplation of ferocity, evenhanded or not. They tend to feel more

comfortable

with

" approaches."

The

interest

analysts'

typical

preoccupation with the states in which the parties are based is

considered unprincipled by conservatives; and the forum preference

characteristic of interest analysis is thought unacceptably indulgent to
the plaintiff and the parochial, selfish state.
III. AN EMPIRICAL TuRN

Dean Symeonides is one of the more tolerant and patient voices

in these ongoing controversies. Whether he is explaining the ways

43. Non-forum law tends to be defendant-favoring because the plaintiff has the choice
of forum.
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of Europeans to Americans,44 or, as here, explaining the ways of

Americans to Europeans, or simply thinking about American conflicts
law, he has played a fundamentally optimistic and healing part. He

is adept in modern methods, and at the same time a hopeful advocate

for a return to rule-based choices. His codifications, for all that they

are codifications, bear the impress of modern thinking. Other great

writers in the field, the late Robert Leflar, Elliot Cheatham, Willis

Reese, and David Cavers, struggled to find sets of general "principles"

as guidelines to choosing law, as has my esteemed colleague, Russell
Weintraub. But none of these writers sought to go

back

to the future.

Nor were any of them interested in the retrograde project of detailed

codification. All were realists, not formalists. Symeonides is much

more conservative than those writers. But he is more respectful of

counter-arguments than other conservatives. In this way, he has

become something of an enigma - a man of mystery. Where does he
stand? Is he in the defendants' corner, with the other conservatives?

Does his acknowledgement of the advances made by the interest
analysts push him into the plaintiffs' corner, with the modernists and

liberals? Does his concern for justice do so? Or, like D avid Cavers, his
avowed idol, is he seeking the elusive holy grail of conflicts neutrality?
Perhaps the greatest pleasure the reader will take in

Choice-of-Law Revolution

The American

will derive from the access it affords to

Symeonides' innermost thinking. For although his book opens as a

simple descriptive record organized along standard familiar lines, it

quickly leaves the familiar behind and becomes an extended internal
dialogue.

This may seem all the more surprising because Symeonides is, first

and foremost, a phenomenologist. The reader unfamiliar with his

other recent work will be struck by the turn toward empiricism
manifest in

The American Choice-of-Law Revolution

on virtually

every page. Writers in the field have been calling for an "empirical

turn,"45 and, whether or not they were influenced by Symeonides'
earlier work, Symeonides has taken that turn here. By this I mean

much more than that he has consulted cases in the usual
commentator's way. The American Choice-of-Law Revolution is
veritably lit up with charts, diagrams and tables; and it is not simply
illumined by these materials, but argued closely from them.

44. See, e.g. , Symeon C. Symeonides, The Mixed Legal System ofthe Republic of Cyprus,
78 TuL. L. REV. 441 (2003).
45. See, e.g. , William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Prolegomenon - to an
Empirical Restatement of Conflicts, 75 IND. L. J. 417 (2000). See also, e.g., Ralph U. Whitten,
U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International and Domestic
(Revisited), 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 559 (2002); Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-law
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 350 (1992).
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thinks

at

once

of

Brainerd

Currie's

powerful

tabular

representations of conflicts cases, their variants and outcomes. But
Currie needed to provide only a very few tables to make his points,

and to make Currie's points casebooks today need use only two or

three of those tables, edited to weed out Currie's occasional mistakes.
Others

have

also

made

useful

contributions

through

visual

representations. William Richman, for example, working in Ohio,

built on interest analysis to devise a novel technique of analyzing

conflicts

cases

through

diagramming

them.46

Richman's

analytic

diagrams have been remarkably successful in conveying to successor

generations the interest-analytic way of thinking. But these sorts of
materials are visualizations of abstract legal theory. Dean Symeonides'

tables perform quite different functions.
The tables in

The American Choice-of-Law Revolution

are far

more concerned with actual cases in the courts than with theoretical
abstractions. Symeonides limits his field of observation to cases of tort,

the setting for most choice-of-law litigation. To these cases he brings
an overarching, almost sociological perspective, with something like

a political scientist's interest in discerning patterns. How

is

the

outcome of a tort case related to the choice-of-law method employed?

How

does

this

relationship

fare

for

different

case

patterns?

Symeonides separates j oint-domicile cases from split-domicile cases.

He tabulates cases in which the forum has one, then two, then three

significant contacts with a case. He plots cases in which a state has

defendant-affiliating contacts against cases in which a state has

plaintiff-affiliating contacts. He charts these sorts of things for true
conflicts, false conflicts, and unprovided-for cases, noting, in an
interest-analytic way, which of the two parties the particular law

favors. He looks at different substantive fields of tort law, cases in

which "conduct-regulating" rules are at issue and cases in which "loss

allocating rules" are at issue. His rich graphical resources, then, are

deployed to capture and put within our grasp the results of important
and multidimensional empirical inquiries.

All this is in aid of a most interesting mission. As might be

expected from a codifier of conflicts law, Symeonides remains strongly

predisposed toward the relative security of rules. In his persuasive,

characteristically evenhanded way, he argues the case forcefully for

well-considered choice rules. He is not overly concerned to describe or
defend the rules he has enshrined in the Louisiana Code.

His

references to them are for the most part couched in generalities. His
concern throughout this book, rather, is in the empirical question:

How are conflicts cases actually playing out in the courts? He offers

46. See William M. Richman, Graphic Forms in Conflict of Laws, 27 U. TOL. L. REV.
631 (1996); William M. Richman, Diagramming Conflicts, 43 OHIO ST. L. J. 317 (1982).
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synthesis.

He is not so

much interested in inventing solutions and then proposing and

advocating them - the usual path of conflicts theorists - as he is in

changing our minds about the

sources

of rule-based solutions. He is

not interested in devising rules. Rather, he wants to derive them.
This, he tells us, was the method he employed in authoring the

Louisiana conflicts code. All the charts, tables, diagrams - and the

thinking that went into them and is gleaned from them - are there to

furnish the

raw material of rules of choice of tort law.

Dean

Symeonides deals with commonplace cases, a good many of them,

remarkably current cases, a collection of well-realized materials more

interesting and varied than can be found elsewhere. His ambition is to

put

in

rule

Institute 's

form what courts actually

Restatements

do.

The American Law

purport to do something of the sort; but they

tend, in the end, to be both discriminating and reforming. Moreover,

no

massive

phenomenological

inquiries

go

into

a

Restatement.

Typically, a few leading cases appear as supporting references in a
Reporter's Notes. But Dean Symeonides acts on the principle that

what courts do, and their measure of agreement in what they do, are
phenomena to be taken very seriously indeed. Symeonides has the

strong conviction that to glean truth from reality one has to handle a
great deal of reality, and to do so with utmost care.

Nor is Symeonides' idea that of most other writers, to

change what

courts are doing. Like the late Professor Albert Ehrenzweig, he has

come to feel instead that - whatever courts say they are doing - they

will tend to gravitate toward established patterns of choice of law.

These, Ehrenzweig thought, were the "true rules."47 Of course, the

task of gleaning principles from cases is familiar to every student of
the common law. But Symeonides' work, like Ehrenzweig's, stands as
something of a reproach to the rest of us. We have been so concerned

with abstract "rules" ahd formal "approaches" that we have not been

doing the common lawyer's job. We have been so busy teaching the
judges that we have not been learning from them. As for those whose

writing has also taken an empirical turn, Symeonides ' work may
suggest to them

that their samples have been too small,

their

categories too careless, the number of their categories too limited,

their inquiries too scattershot and disorganized. No legal realist could
shrug off Dean Symeonides' "rules" as mere abstractions. Concededly,
the kinds of rules he is proposing would be too complex, layered,

many-sided, to be true rules themselves, and, concededly, they would

47. See ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 465 (1962);
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and " True Rules," 49 CAL. L. REV.
240 (1961). Ehrenzweig argued, for example, that in choosing law to determine the validity
of contracts, the "true rule" manifest in judicial opinions was not "the law of the place of
contracting," but rather a "rule of validation." EHRENZWEIG , TREATISE, supra, at 465.
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be tempered by some sensitive modernist tweaking. But they would

build

on true rules.

The American Choice-of-Law Revolution

argues

that the choice-of-law process needs rules, but the rules it is talking

about would give the courts the guidance, as seen in an improving

mirror, of their

own reflection.

This mirror for magistrates would, indeed, be an improving one. It

is a notable feature of the book, accounting for not a little of its depth
and dimensionality, that Symeonides, conservative as he is, is also
confessedly and not ungratefully dependent on the basic insights and
concepts of the interest analysts. To be sure, this kind of pragmatic,

matured traditionalism is not unique to Symeonides. Interest analysis

has been incorporated into all the modem methods in some degree.

With few exceptions, even the least temperate of its critics no longer

resists thinking and speaking interest-analytically. In short, interest

analysis is the very language of contemporary conflicts theory, and

although few courts can be said to have adopted it in any formal way,

it often furnishes the language of courts that have formally adopted

some other technique. Dean Symeonides, too, resorts to the
vocabulary and methods of interest analysis, not only in wrestling with
the contending modern theories, or in surveying fields of case law, but

even when advocating a return to choice rules. Unhampered by

ideological wrath in a very politicized field, Symeonides accepts and is

content with the modern American framework for debate.

IV. IRRATIONAL AND DISCRIMINATORY CHOICES

From his empirical inquiries Symeonides discovers some rather

surprising facts. We learn that consideration of policies and interests is
not producing the disproportionate plaintiff victories that critics of

interest analysis predicted - perhaps because a good number of

judges never did get the hang of interest analysis. Nor do decisions
that

are

interest-analytic exhibit the forum bias that B rainerd Currie

the

Second Restatement,

thought made the best sense and that so exasperates his critics. As for
although Dean Symeonides adj udges it at

best a "mixed blessing,"48 it has not led to disproportionate plaintiff

victories either.

Findings of this kind can be riveting. They are especially so in the

lectures displaying how American courts are handling false conflicts,

true conflicts, and unprovided-for cases. Symeonides discovers, for
example, that in fully two thirds of the unprovided-for cases surveyed

by

him,

the

court

uninterested state.

applied

the

Fully two thirds.

defendant-protecting

law

of

an

Symeonides points out that these

48. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (And a
Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 IND. L. J. 437 (2000).
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Second Restatement

or

other approaches that led judges to believe that they were not

authorized to analyze governmental interests.49 He notes that, even

when the defendant-favoring law was forum law, forum law was

applied not as residual law, as Currie recommended, but - in the

absence of significant contacts at the forum - on the basis of

contacts. Sometimes the law of the uninterested place of
injury was chosen to protect the tortfeasor - a thoroughly irrational

insignificant

result, since, as we have seen, the general public policy of a place of

inj ury would undoubtedly be better served by application of the
remedial law available at the forum. Intriguingly, Symeonides reports
these sorts of findings with full comprehension, but

without dismay.

Dean Symeonides might regret such results - we do not know
whether he does or not - as falling short of what he would call
"material justice. " But I read him as satisfied by such results - that to
him they are examples of what he would call, with the late David
Cavers, "conflicts justice."50 In his thinking, such results may well be
hopeful signs that principle can prevail over mere sympathy. The

forum, in his view, must be neutral, not "selfish" and "unilateral. "
These cautionary ideas become even more imperative, i n his view,

when the forum is an uninterested one. Indeed, an aggregation of
contacts, albeit insignificant contacts, in Symeonides' view, is useful in
otherwise unprovided-for cases. Even insignificant contacts can serve

as neutral tie-breakers, leading courts away from the "selfish" and

"unilateral" law of the forum in half the cases. It is the clincher to an

argument of this kind that in fact courts do seem to be acting under

the impress of such ideas. As Symeonides' charts suggest, courts seem

to be deciding conflicts cases of all kinds more by unreasoned contact

counting than anything else. But Symeonides is not in the business of

criticizing these cases. To him, they speak volumes. These cases, j ust
or unjust, rational or not, are

authority.

Of course, as Symeonides is fully aware, application of the

defendant-protecting law of an uninterested state in a case of tort

is

irrational and unj ust. Such a result is obviously a denial of material

justice. But I part company with Symeonides when he does not find
such a result too irrational to fit his idea of conflicts justice. Courts
must presume the truth of a complaint in hearing argument on a

choice-of-law issue bearing on ultimate liability. So when a court

49. For the misleading mechanics of Restatement (Second), see Weinberg, A Structural
Revision, supra note 27, at 477-82.

50. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem: Addendum 1972, 17
HARV. INT'L L. J. 651, 652-55 (1976) (clarifying his concern as one for "conflicts justice").
Cavers had originally urged, quite to the contrary, the higher ideal of "justice in the
individual case." See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. REV. 173, 193, 198-200 (1933).
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chooses the defendant-protecting law of an uninterested state, a

presumptively meritorious claim is defeated

for no reason.

The best

that can be said of a tort case applying the defendant-protecting law of
an uninterested state is that at least the defense was good under

some

state's law, and at least the defendant with this plausible though

irrelevant defense was protected from having to pay for his tort, with

whatever social benefits inhere in allowing defendants or their insurers
to keep their money. But I cannot help thinking it unwise to protect
the defendant if his own state would not. On the other hand, the

plaintiff-favoring law in an unprovided-for case is likely, at least, to

reflect general policies both states share. Although no law "applies" in
an unprovided-for case, all states share the general policies underlying
tort

law,

policies

favoring

compensation,

deterrence,

and

risk

spreading. Defenses, on the other hand, often embody special local

concerns that may not reflect substantive policies that are as widely
shared.51

Why is irrationality in choice of law so intractable? Is there not

some general but principled guide that will enable judges to decide
cases with less damage? A just result is not a bad thing. Result

orientedness, unprincipled as it is said to be, may not be as bad as the

unjust results avoided by it.52 Yet even if we were willing to accept a
rule that reads, "Let the plaintiff have a chance to prove her case," or,
"Law at the plaintiff's option," we still might not have found a rule

51. Procedural defenses and other defenses off the merits typically do embody
somewhat shared policies; but their protections of nonresident defendants are at best
incidental to their forum-protecting or forum-enhancing purposes. When a statute of
limitations is applied qua forum law, it is properly applied either to protect the forum from
stale claims or, arguably, to keep the door open to suit by residents. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 142(g) (permitting the forum to apply its own longer
statute unless the forum has little interest in doing so). At the 1991 meeting of the ALI I
moved an amendment from the floor, that present section 142(g) be added to section 142,
and this motion carried. I argued that it would be anomalous if the forum could apply its
own longer statute only to benefit nonresident plaintiffs. See PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 69TH ANNUAL MEETING, at 211-216 (1992). The Supreme
Court has held that the forum always has constitutional power over the limitation of actions,
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). See Louise Weinberg, Choosing Law: The
Limitations Debates, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 683. But see, e.g. , Kathryn F. Nelson, The 1990
Federal "Fallback " Statute of Limitations: Limitations by Default, 72 NEB. L. REV. 454 (1993)
(criticizing § 142(g) as making it impossible for defendants to plan since they cannot tell
when they have achieved repose). This criticism of the forum's longer statute subordinates
the plaintiffs substantive claim to the defendant's alleged need to plan, without taking into
account that the defendant typically does not plan a tort, would not do so depending on the
length of some preferred statute of limitations, and that the defendant's insurer has actuarial
expertise and a full opportunity ex ante to take into consideration the longest likely period of
repose. Moreover, Nelson's view would permit defendants to carry their statute of
limitations about with them wherever they commit their torts. Yet the policy of repose for
the defendant would be of scant concern to the forum qua forum, being more particularly a
concern of the state in which the defendant is based, whether at the forum or another state.
52 See generally Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L. J. 53 (1991); Weinberg,
On Departing from Forum Law, supra note 36.
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that would produce material justice in all cases. Some time ago I tried
to come to grips with the problem of immoral law.53 I posited
intolerable law, the law of slavery, in a contact state. I found no

standard rule of choice that could be relied on to avoid outcomes that

seemed to me plainly immoral. The problem inheres in the very idea

of a body of rules governing choices of law. Superimposing an abstract

choice-of-law process upon a case can insulate the mind from needful

thought. It can also insulate the mind from the plight of the parties,

the substance of law, and the requisites of justice in the individual

case. As the legal realists warned, the more principled the application

the more arbitrary the likely result.

V. THE LAW OF THE FORUM
Of course, unfettered judicial discretion is hardly a palatable or

even workable option. Some guidance is usually welcome. Even a
seemingly inflexible rule

can offer political cover in a difficult

situation, or an escape from it. A default position can be particularly

useful. Default rules are invented to resolve the problem of the
insoluble problem in a way that will do least harm.

As far as a default position is concerned, it might not be a bad idea

to return to Brainerd Currie's original recommendation of residual

forum law for the insoluble choice-of-law problem. Although forum

law must be resisted in an immoral polity, forum law in America today

ought to work. It certainly ought to work for Dean Symeonides, if only
because, historically, forum law has been the overwhelming judicial
choice. After all, judges are sworn to enforce and uphold their own
states' laws. We can hang on to that.

Other vital needs are served by forum law in every category of

cases. The court applying its own law, even the uninterested court, at
least vindicates policies declared in its own legislation or case law.
Moreover, the court applying its own law avoids the discriminations
that departures from forum law must entail.54 (Symeonides believes
that arguments about discrimination are specious. He says that those

arguments have been overcome, but he offers no authority for that

53. Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases, or, Night
Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316 (1997). For more well-known efforts, see,
e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY

(1981); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1975); A. E. Keir Nash, In re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The
Relation of Law and History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274 (1983); John Phillip Reid, Lessons of
Lumpkin: A Review of Recent Literature on Law, Comity, and the Impending Crisis, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 571 (1982); Note, American Slavery and the Conflict of Laws, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 74, 75 (1971).
54. See Weinberg, On Departingfrom Forum Law, supra note 36.
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view, and I am unaware of any.55) Although, of course, in a true

conflict case, both states have constitutional power, the forum that
departs from its own presumably remedial law56 in a true conflict case
may be discriminating between two classes of its resident plaintiffs. It

is permitting residents injured by residents to recover, but denying

relief to residents injured by nonresidents, even though both classes of

defendants are within the forum's j urisdiction

ex hypothesi.

This

discrimination will seem particularly arbitrary where the nonresident
defendant has entered the forum state and injured the resident

plaintiff at her home there. Moreover, the forum departing from its
own remedial law in a true conflict case is also discriminating against

its resident defendants, requiring them to pay for their torts in wholly
domestic cases, while permitting nonresident defendants within its
j urisdiction to escape liability for the same torts. Of course, these

choices of law are not arbitrary or irrational in a true conflict case. But
they

are

discriminatory,

since

the

tortfeasor's

nonresidence

is

irrelevant to the remedial interests of the forum. Consider also that

plaintiffs

are

likely

to

litigate

at

home,

an

observation

Dean

Symeonides finds substantiated statistically, and that forum law is very

likely to be constitutional if it favors the resident plaintiff, since she is

likely to be within its intended protections.

Although arguments supporting choices of forum law, or law that

frankly favors the plaintiff, would not appeal to Dean Symeonides'

55. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 277-78 (1992)
(acknowledging that, at best, judges can choose only between the lesser of two kinds of
discrimination, interstate discrimination caused by interest analysis and intrastate
discrimination caused by territorialism). As might be expected from an unreconstructed
territorialist, Professor Laycock chooses intrastate discrimination as the lesser of two evils,
and relies on the fact that the Founders did not provide against intrastate discrimination.
Certainly there is no explicit equal protection clause in the Fifth Amendment, and even if
there had been, there was no mechanism for making the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV deals only with interstate
discrimination. But given the need to include the slave states in the Union, the Founders
could not give us an equal protection clause. For the same reason, the Founders left civil
rights vis-a-vis the states generally in the hands of the states themselves. Article IV aside, the
national Constitution was not addressed to intrastate governance. Thus, the want of an equal
protection clause, and indeed, the want of a Fourteenth Amendment, affords scant support
for Laycock's inference that the Founders "did not fear" intrastate discrimination. Rather, it
was an issue they could not and did not address. I should add that the founding generation
did not have the advantage of modern choice-of-law methods. Creatures of the
Enlightenment that they were, I should think judges of the Founding era would have
preferred interest analysis to territorialism, since territorialism relies only on mechanical
formalae, whatever their virtues, whereas interest analysis relies on reason. See, e.g., Chief
Justice Marshall's understanding in 1803, supra note 30, of the need for rational construction
of Jaw before it can be applied.
56. I posit remedial law at the forum because the plaintiff has the choice of forum. But
of course, it often happens that the plaintiff, with little real opportunity for forum shopping,
sues at home, although the Jaw of the forum is unfavorable to her, relying on the Jaw of some
other contact state.
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sense of fair play and evenhandedness, there are other good reasons,
beyond the need to avoid discrimination, that should counsel courts to
steer clear of defendant-favoring law when plaintiff-favoring law is
available. Systematic choices of plaintiff-favoring law are better public

policy than systematic choices of defendant-favoring law.

When

defendants engage in risky activities in reliance upon lax standards in

their home states, shared public policies (favoring safety and fair
dealing) would seein better served not by indulging such defendants in

their race to the regufatory bottom, but rather by permitting plaintiffs

injured by

those activities to

seek

enforcement of higher legal

standards. It is also sound public policy, universally recognized in
American tort law, that innocent plaintiffs not bear the risk of their
own injuries. Moreover, a court denying its own law to the suitor who
has come to it for relief risks contributing to a regime of global

lawiessness. For surely global lawlessness must follow from endemic

non-enforcement of law and widespread denials of access to justice.57

Thus, the forum generally will have sound reasons to apply its own
law. And forum law is likely to favor the plaintiff, since the forum is

the plaintiff's to choose. Currie's recommendation of the law of the
forum as the preferred residual choice seems right, although he was

diplomatic enough and conservative enough not to give these sorts of
reasons.

The argument is sometimes made that the defendant is unfairly

surprised and cannot adequately structure its enterprise if it is to be
stripped of its defenses under an interested state's laws. Yet a

defendant's insurer is the paradigmatic actuarial expert, and has every

opportunity to structure the insured's coverage accordingly. It has

every opportunity to adjust the defendant's premiums to take into

account this and other risks. Given the near universality of liability

insurance among suable defendants, it is somewhat unreal to speak of
"unfair surprise"

to tort defendants. They have insured against

liability precisely because they anticipate it under some state's laws.

But what should be the result when the forum has unfavorable law,
but the plaintiff must sue there? This is commonly the situation in the
unprovided-for case. Should the forum in an unprovided-for case
depart from its own defendant-favoring law to let the plaintiff prove

her case? Even such a departure might be discriminatory. When the

plaintiff must sue at home, it would be discriminatory to permit her to

recover if the other state would let her, if the forum would deny relief
to plaintiffs in wholly domestic cases. A departure from defendant-

57. I argue this in Weinberg, Against Comity, supra note 52. For relevant recent
discussion see, e.g., Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The
Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002); Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 627 (2001); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L. J.
1 (1991).
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favoring forum law would also discriminate between defendants in

domestic cases, who are protected from liability, and defendants in
conflicts cases, who are not. The forum can escape this bind by frankly

acknowledging that the other state's remedial law is "better" law, and
adopting it as its own.58

VI. THE " Loss OF INNOCENCE "
How does Symeonides come out on this most interesting of

conflicts

questions?

What

is

his

preferred

default

position

for

otherwise insoluble cases? Here, his thinking may have been cloiided

by a certain over-refinement. Much of Symeonides' book is organized
to distinguish between " loss-distributing" and " conduct-regulating"
law.59 For example, compensatory damages, he explains, are "loss

distributing," and properly the business of the place of injury or the
plaintiff's

residence.

Punitive

damages,

on

the

other

hand,

are

"conduct regulating, " and properly the business of the place of
wrongful conduct. Symeonides has been among the important

popularizers of this distinction, but it is surprising that he has taken it
so seriously. Professor Little recently described this sort of distinction,

correctly, I think, as spurious and
appears

to

have

embarrassingly
categories,

been

wrong -

influenced
New

"hair-splitting."6()
by

York

the

case

Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America. 61

Symeonides

doubtful

that

-

launched

even

these

In that case, the court

was so blinded by its characterization of the defense of charitable

immunity as "loss-allocating," that, in the midst of an expensive " I

love New York" campaign intended t o attract tourists, the highest

court in New York, in effect, declared open season on visiting Boy

Scouts. Disasters like this occur, as the legal realists warned, when we
are overly abstract about choosing law. It is an exercise in specious

reasoning to purport to choose between laws we have pigeon-holed in
advance. That is the way law was chosen under the

First Restatement,

a

58. See Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 501-03 (arguing that it is
better judicial process for courts applying non-forum law to "adopt" rather than "choose"
it).
59. See also La. Civ. Code art. 3544; Symeon Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of
Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 66 TUL. L. REV. 677, 699, 715-31 (1992).
60. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 934 (2004). See also, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr.,
Codifying Interest Analysis in the Torts Chapter of a New Conflicts Restatement, 75 IND. L. J.
591, 594 (2000).
61. 480 N.E.2d 679, 686 (N.Y. 1985) (applying the charitable immunity law of New
Jersey to defeat the wrongful death claim of the family of a child who committed suicide
after being sexually abused on a scouting trip in New York, although under New York law
the organization was not immune, in part on the ground that charitable immunity is loss
distributing rather than conduct-regulating).

1656

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 103:1631

process the late David Cavers derided as "jurisdiction-selecting."62
Jurisdiction-selecting rules wind up choosing places, not laws. The

danger in choosing territory instead of law lies in allocating governing

power to a state before we know what that state's law is,63 and, in so
doing, insulating the choice from both the living case and the
operation of reason.

The mistake comes back to haunt Symeonides in his discussion of

products liability cases. In charting his products liability conflicts,64
Symeonides reveals to us that in more than half the cases studied,
courts are choosing law that favors defendants. In other words, the
makers and distributors of defective products, in more than half the

cases, contrary to the most basic policies underlying products liability
law, are succeeding in shifting the social cost of the injuries they cause

to the injured and their dependents. Symeonides is struck by these

unlikely findings. He suggests that a newly conservative judiciary may

be

partly responsible.

He

thinks

that without

modern

conflicts

methods the defendant tilt might be even heavier. D efendant-favoring

outcomes, he supposes, might also to some extent be a consequence of

the tort reform movement.
But

then,

swinging

into

his

discussion

of

products

cases,

Symeonides situates products liability outside the ordinary law of tort.

Ordinary tort law, he explains, is "conduct-regulating," while products

liability is "loss-distributing. " And indeed, the distinction makes sense,

considered as an abstract proposition. Since products liability in our
time has generally not been based on fault, it seems unconvincing to

argue that it is fairer to place the risk of injury on innocent defendants

than on innocent plaintiffs. It seems more convincing to ground

products liability on risk-spreading policies, sensibly allocating to
defendants the burden of insuring, especially since defendants are in a
better position to spread the costs of insuring. Such loss-shifting and

risk-spreading policies, though contested, are well understood and
widely shared.

So far so good. But what happens when a true conflict is about

punitive damages in a products case? That was the problem before the
federal court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1 996, in Kelly

62. See David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 180 (1933).
63. Jurisdiction-selecting appears to be unavoidable when the conflict is between federal
and state governance. The problem arises from the exigencies of Erie on the one hand and
the Supremacy Clause on the other. See generally Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine
Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235
(1999); Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1743 (1992).
64. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The 1990s
and Beyond, 78 TuL. L. REV. 1247 (2004).
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v. Ford Motor Co.65 Kelly

was a products case in which punitive

damages were sought for a wrongful death. The decedent was killed in
her home state, Pennsylvania, while driving a defective car she had

bought there. The only out-of-state feature of the case was that the car
had

been

designed

and

manufactured

in

Michigan.

Under

Pennsylvania law, the plaintiffs were entitled to punitive damages.

Under Michigan law, only compensatory damages were available. The
federal

diversity

court,

sitting

in

Pennsylvania,

opined,

without

consulting Pennsylvania policy on the question, that punitive damages

are excessive and destabilizing to the financial stability of defendants.

The court then held conclusorily that Pennsylvania would choose

Michigan law on this issue, thus denying punitive damages to the

plaintiff. The court cited no authority for the proposition that in a
products case Pennsylvania would choose foreign law to avoid
imposing punitive damages on an egregiously negligent defendant who

has injured

a

Pennsylvanian

on Pennsylvania

roads.

Symeonides, in a startlingly revelatory passage, praises the

But

Dean

Kelly court

for resisting the "all-too-common temptation" to apply forum law to

favor the local bereaved.

This sort of rigor, a resistance to retributive justice (or, in other

cases, even to compassion), can have its seductions, even for very fair
minded people. There are those for whom

deference

and

comity

are

obviously to be preferred to a forum's "selfish" interests. To be sure,

Michigan, as the place of manufacture, has an interest in protecting its
defendant car makers from non-compensatory damages, in order to

protect its automotive industry without denying full compensatory
damages to those injured by the industry's products. This makes the

case a true conflict, but it does not

decide

the case. The fact that

Michigan is an interested state does not strip Pennsylvania of its own

policies and interests. As the place of injury and the place where its
citizen was killed, Pennsylvania had every interest in punishment and

deterrence, interests based on road safety policies widely shared with
other states. Indeed, it seems odd that the manufacturer in

Kelly

should escape the force of Pennsylvania's usual punitive damages rule

because it

sent

its instrument of death into Pennsylvania instead of

manufacturing it there. The federal district court also had a process

interest in evenhandedly affording the Pennsylvania family the same
full measure of Pennsylvania's retributive justice that Pennsylvania
courts meted out in other cases. (I pause to note with some

amusement that all but one of the affiliating contacts with the case

were in Pennsylvania - a bit of old-fashioned contact-counting of the
sort that Symeonides is generally content to use as a tie-breaker.)

65. Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 933 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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a slip? Well, yes and no.

Symeonides believes that punitive damages are "conduct-regulating"

and thus are the proper business of the place of conduct On the other
hand,

are

Kelly

cases

was a products case, and for Symeonides, products cases

of "loss

distribution,"

not

"conduct

regulation."

Loss

distribution, for Symeonides, is the proper business of the place where

the loss was suffered. All this puts Symeonides in the mind-boggling

position of attributing conduct-regulating power in
conduct-regulating state.

Kelly

Kelly

to the non

can be evaluated without tying oneself into knots of that

kind. In thinking about

Kelly,

nothing should turn on the fact that it is

a products case, since it is hardly a no-fault case. The issue was

punitive damages, after all, and punitive damages are awarded only on
proof of fault - egregious fault.

"Egregious fault," in fact,

Pennsylvania's own test for punitive damages.66 It

is

appears that

Pennsylvania, both as place of injury and place where the decedent

resided, had conduct-regulating interests at least as compelling as

Michigan's, wherever the actionable conduct occurred. Egregiously
causing the death of a Pennsylvania woman on a Pennsylvania road is

certainly conduct that cries out for punitive damages. But on this issue

it is hard to see why the place of manufacture, for all its power in its

own courts, should trump the place of injury in

its

courts.67 As the

place of manufacture, Michigan did and does have general regulatory
interests. B ut, in Kelly, Michigan's policy was not to regulate its
manufacturers

of egregiously faulty cars, beyond

their ordinary

exposure to compensatory damages. No "regulatory" purpose at all

can be attributed to Michigan vis-a-vis punitive damages. Regulating
the

Ford

Motor

Company

to

discourage

egregious

fault

was

Michigan's prerogative , but Michigan failed to exercise it. All we can
reasonably say is that Michigan law is intended to protect its local

automotive industry from all but strictly compensatory liabilities -

even, or rather,

especially,

in cases of egregious fault on the industry's

part. Of course, Michigan may constitutionally protect its resident

companies from punitive damages in its own courts. But it is hard to

see why this Michigan policy, which seems about as "selfish" as it

could be short of denying damages altogether,

should have any

extraterritorial effect at all. Pennsylvania was under no obligation to

subordinate its own law and policies to another state's law and

66. See, e.g. , Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1096 (Pa. 1985) (holding
under Pennsylvania law that punitive damages will be imposed for egregious misconduct).
67. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding, in a California case
in which a California plaintiff was injured in California by a vehicle driven by a driver for the
University of Nevada, that California had legitimate governmental interests such that it
could constitutionally apply its no-sovereign-immunity rule to a sister state, Nevada, even
though Nevada was substantially immune under its own law).
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policies, certainly not to another state's interests in protecting its local

industry's egregious wrongdoing, and certainly not where the result is

an unsafe condition on Pennsylvania's roads, and the death of a

Pennsylvanian.
By not falling into the "temptation" of allowing the plaintiffs
access to punitive damages, the federal court in

Kelly

failed to impress

upon the defendant the gravity of conduct that caused a death far

from the place of manufacture; failed to punish the defendant for it,
failed to deter future such conduct, with foreseeable impact on road

safety, and failed to pressure the defendant to pay the costs of

maintaining better standards. These are concerns Pennsylvania shares

with many states, even if subordinated in Michigan. Dean Symeonides

deplores "unilateralism," a vice he attributes to modern methods in
choice of law,68 and esteems "multilateralism"69 instead. But would not
"multilateralism" have been better served in

Kelly

by vindication of

these multistate policies than by deference to Michigan's "selfish"

interest in protecting its industry's poor manufacturing practices and

unsafe designs? The federal court in Pennsylvania, it appears, fell into
the "temptation" of deferring to defendant-favoring law, and in so

doing flouted the laws of the state in which it sat.70 It did so without

the rigor of the required vicarious analysis on the merits, instead

concealing this departure from forum law and policy behind a veil of

conflicts verbiage.71 Had the federal court done its work on the merits,

68. Dean Symeonides also spells out his argument favoring "rnultilateralisrn" over
"unilateralism" in Symeon C. Syrneonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st
Century, 37 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 1 (2001).
69. For recent comment on arguments of this class, see generally Stanley E. Cox,
Substantive, Multilateral, and Unilateral Choice-of-Law Approaches, 37 WILLAMETIE L.

REV. 171 (2001).

70. Cf Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that the
obligation of a federal district court applying state law is to apply the whole law of the state,
including its choice rules). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue of
choice of law in products cases, but lower Pennsylvania courts in products cases evidently
are choosing the law of the plaintiffs residence and not the place of manufacture. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Bayer AG. 2004 WL 1 146692 (Pa. Corn. Pl. 2004) (not reported in A.2d) (holding in
a class action that liability for statin-caused health problems would be governed by the law
of each plaintiffs residence) . Cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979): "In this case,
California's interest is the . . . substantial one of providing full protection to those who are
injured on its highways through the negligence of both residents and nonresidents.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Pennsylvania's retributive policy might even
have gained force from the fact that the defendant's own state, the place of conduct, would
not itself penalize the company's egregious fault - especially if a Pennsylvania court would
have taken notice of the fact that over 40,000 Americans die in traffic accidents every year,
hundreds of Pennsylvanians among them. Nor is there any indication in Pennsylvania cases
that Pennsylvania shares the postmodern view that punitive damages are disfavored. The
conclusion seems inescapable that the federal court in Kelly decided the case in gross
disregard of the forum state's interests.
71. Had the court in Kelly been a state court, after the departure from Pennsylvania law
Pennsylvania's policy would have been perceived to have been eroded, and might no longer
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it would have identified and vindicated Pennsylvania's policy favoring
the punishment of egregious fault in causing a fatal tort to its citizens

on its roads. By so doing it would have avoided discriminating

irrationally between two classes of Pennsylvania's decedents - those

who could recover because the product that killed them at home in
Pennsylvania was made in Pennsylvania, and those who could not

because the product that killed them at home in Pennsylvania was sent

into Pennsylvania.72

The key to the riddle of Symeonides' satisfaction with Kelly is that,

for him,

regretted.

modernist

Modernist

thinking about conflicts is somewhat to be
thinking

has

been

a

letting-go

of

what

Symeonides believes to be the highest ideal of judicial process:

neutrality. He mourns this loss of apparent neutrality as a "loss of
innocence. "73 Yet as Symeonides continues his deep conversation with
himself, the reader begins to appreciate how much of the author's

thinking is informed by a lively consciousness of the legal realists'
message, and by the humane view that justice as a general rule

ought

to triumph. The excitement of the book, its building interest, is in

Symeonides' continuing inner struggle with these conflicting ideals. He

personifies in himself the underlying clash of values that is at the heart

of the choice-of-law problem.

VII. " S M ART RULES" AND "CONFLICTS JUSTICE "
Arguing

his

way

toward

his

ultimate

proposal,

Symeonides

tentatively considers the possible advantages of rules that point

toward law that is substantively "better." He is keenly aware of
choice-of-law policies counseling avoidance of substandard law, law of

the kind he fell into the trap of approving in his discussion of Kelly.74

Here, in this momentary dalliance with "better law," he is evidently

have been describable unequivocally as favoring punitive damages for egregious fault. See
Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 502 (arguing that departures from forum
law indicate the forum's preference for foreign law; suggesting that 'the cleaner, more honest
approach would be for the forum to "adopt" rather than "choose" another state's law when
that state's law is perceived to be "better"); Weinberg, On Departing from Forum Law,
supra note 36, at 601 ("a court that has found the law of a sister state to be ' better' than its
own . . . has inescapably discerned its own current policy. Once that happens, the cleaner,
more direct approach would be to make a change in local law. Even a statutory rule may be
interpreted to conform to existing local policy, although this latter option may not always be
practicable; but setting to one side the stumbling-block of outworn or wrong-headed
legislation, identification of ' better law' in a sister state will inevitably suggest to the forum
the advisability of adopting the sister state's view as its own.").

72 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73. Symeonides, American Choice of Law, supra note 68, at 45-46.
74. But see the close of note 70, supra, for the possibility that in today's conservative
climate the law considered "better" in the past might be considered "substandard" today,
and vice versa.
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influenced by the work of the late Friedrich Juenger.75 I am not quite
sure how Juenger's view differs from the "better law" approach

proposed by the late Professor Leflar.76 For both writers, in the end it
is plaintiff-favoring law that is "better," and defenses that tend to be
"substandard." " Substandard" was Juenger's word for lax regulatory

standards and special local defenses.
Symeonides favorably contrasts

Juenger's

proposal

of

rules

pointing to quality law with the usual sorts of rules that point to places,
without regard to the quality.of the law at the chosen place. Juenger's
rules do succeed in escaping the opprobrium of being "jurisdiction

selecting. "77 Dean Syrneonides acknowledges that his own conflicts
codes are in their nature "jurisdiction-selecting," but explains that

they have been influenced by "better law" thinking. Yet he also
confesses unease about the "better law" project. Which laws are
better? Characteristically avoiding the political aspect of the question,

Symeonides simply points out that cataloguing all laws on a scale of

intrinsic merit would be a hopeless task. But is discerning better law
really so hopeless a task? Like many conservatives, Symeonides does
not believe, or perhaps does not want to believe, the implicit message

in both Leflar's and Juenger's work, that, generally, plaintiff-favoring
law is "better." Their insight gains force from another mid-twentieth

century modernist insight, that the tort plaintiff is, in effect, an agent

of enforcement of law - a private attorney general.78 These modernist
perceptions, old-fashioned as they may seem now, are not the less

sound. The question, for Symeonides, becomes whether the vices of

modernism outweigh these virtues.

Symeonides presents an interesting table of the changes that the

conflicts

revolution

characteristic

"approaches."

features
As

we

has

of

wrought.

the

have

He

old-style

seen,

he

identifies

"rules"

thinks

and

rules

contrasting
new-style

tend

to

be

" multilateral," appreciative of the concerns of other sovereigns, while

modern approaches, with their emphasis on the forum's interests, are

" unilateral." Rules offer "certainty," the new approaches "flexibility."
He contrasts the "territoriality" of the rules with the "non
territoriality" of modern approaches, and envisions a new role for

75. See FRIEDRICH K. JuENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993);
Russell J. Weintraub, Choosing Law with an Eye on the Prize, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 705
(1994) (reviewing Juenger).
76. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 267, 282-304 (1966).
77. For the vice of "jurisdiction-selecting rules," see supra text accompanying note 62.
78. See, e.g. , Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam)
("When a plaintiff brings an action . . . he . . . does so not for himself alone but also as a
'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy. . . . " (citation omitted)).
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territorialism in choice of law. He ascribes to forum preference a near
tribalism, and associates it with our "loss of innocence." Even so, he

ventures to suggest that, taken all in all, the conflicts revolution has
been a good thing. In particular, he acknowledges that "approaches,"

unlike rules, need not fall into the trap of being "jurisdiction
selecting" rather than " law-selecting." But in the end he admonishes

us that the loss of innocence entailed in content-based examination of

law should nevertheless limit the exercise.

Given the preponderance, then, as he sees it, of arguments more

favorable to "rules," Symeonides comes down predictably on the side

of "rules." He believes the pendulum has swung too far in the

direction

of flexibility

and

away from certainty.

Agreeing with

European critics, he feels that the American conflicts revolution has

gone on too long and it is time for it to stabilize. What is needed, he

concludes, is a way of employing the best of both techniques. The
answer must be some better combination of the new with the old.

His ultimate conclusion, which he shares with some modernists, is

that it ought to be possible now to write "smart" rules that will codify
what is best about the American conflicts revolution, rules that will
take into account state policies and interests, and yet will guide the

judges toward the true rules made manifest in their actual work.79 He
has aspired to those sorts of goals in his own codifications. He urges

judges to overcome their "anti-rule syndrome." As for the kinds of
rules he would propose, he favors capacious, complex rules, that bring

to bear a multitude of factors and influences - contingent rules with
fallback positions, sometimes allowing the parties a degree of
influence upon the choice.80 One need not agree with Symeonides'
preference for detailed codifications of conflicts law to find his

argument interesting, fair-minded, and thoughtful. Symeonides' rules
will be complex because they will be sympathetic articulations of
considerations gleaned from a lifetime of study of actual cases.

79. This is also the 1965 proposal of David Cavers, who called for "a body of rules,
principles and standards of a new sort, developed through the workings of stare decisis and
the combined efforts of courts and scholars. . . . " DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 78 (1965).
80. These ideas share some of the aspirations, virtues, and (alas) deficiencies of the
widely ignored rule proposed for mass torts in AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROJECT (Proposed Final Draft, 1993), which received Symeonides' strong support. The
author of the proposed rule was Mary Kay Kane. I do not know to what extent Symeonides'
thinking may have influenced Kane's proposal and vice versa; her choice rule for complex
cases is like Symeonides' codes in its hierarchy of contingencies and its contact counting. On
probable reasons for the unenthusiastic reception of Kane's effort, see, e.g., Gene R. Shreve,
Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation Project, 54 LA. L. REV. 1139 (1994); Louise
Weinberg, Mass Torts at the Neutral Forum: A Critical Analysis of the A Li's Proposed
Choice Rule, · 56 ALA. L. REV. 807 (1993). Yet these critiques fail to account for the
successful adoptions of Symeonides' codes, which Kane's rule resembles.
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But always the problem, for every choice-of-law proposal, however

well-intended, however closely worked, is the question whether we are

willing to give up on justice - whether we are willing to be satisfied

with "conflicts justice," as David Cavers tried to be,81 and as Dean
Symeonides is trying to be. We arrive, then, with Symeonides, at the

heart of the matter. Must "conflicts justice" be attainable only at the

expense of "material justice?" If so, in the face of these conflicting

demands, must we be content merely with "conflicts justice?" What is

the right path? Symeonides feels the tug of "material j ustice. " It is a

powerful aspiration. But somewhat ruefully he confesses that we may

have to be content with "conflicts justice." We will be successful

enough if we can achieve that. He understands and regrets that even

his "smart" rules are likely in a given case to deny "material justice."
Indeed, as the manipulated but much-praised case of

Pratt reminds us,

Milliken v.

"rules, " however "smart," cannot guarantee even the

uniformity and certainty and predictability that Symeonides cares so
much about. In tort cases - the focus of

Revolution

-

The American Choice-of-Law

it is difficult even to believe that predictability matters.

For the most parts torts are unplanned by the parties, rendering

predictability of the law that will be applied to the tort a non-issue at
the time of the tort. And, as I have already remarked, tort cases are
actuarially predicted by the tortfeasor's insurer, an acknowledged

expert with every opportunity to take into account the range of likely
choices of law, and to set premiums accordingly.

81. See CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79, at 86. A personal note:
I should acknowledge that, although I was not the beneficiary of Cavers' (or anybody else's)
formal conflicts course, I was Cavers' student (in an irrelevant seminar). Years later, in one
of his letters, he sent a kind but dispirited warning that "we are in a dying field." I remember
trying to cheer him up, pointing out in reply how much work needed to be done with new
problems and emerging technologies, and ending, "These are great days! " I like to think this
got him back to work. His last articles were about regulatory problems in the atomic age. He
would have enjoyed digging into today's problems of globalization, the internet, terrorism.
See, e.g. , Mathias Reimann, The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in the Cyberage, 24
MICH. J. INT'L L. 663 (2003); Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.
L. & PuB. POL'Y 457 (2002); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive
Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2001). Just before the end, Cavers sent me, out of the blue,
a pile of fading reprints of his work. I still treasure these, although he must have bestowed
similar treasures on other whippersnappers. I remain, with Dean Symeonides, one of Cavers'
many admirers. But Cavers' ideal of "conflicts justice" has always been much less appealing
to me than his original concern for "justice in the individual case." For this earlier position,
see Cavers, A Critique ofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, supra note 62. It was Cavers' "justice
in the individual case" that became Willis Reese's lodestar. See Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict
of Laws and the Restatement Second, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1963, at 690.
Cavers came under heavy fire - as Reese later would - for the supposed nihilism of
"justice in the individual case," and, regrettably, backed off, explaining that he had always
meant only "conflicts justice." CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79, at
86. To the extent I believe this I hope I am wrong. As for Reese's ordeal, see the account in
Weinberg, A Structural Revision, supra note 27, at 483-90.
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A more serious problem for Symeonides' argument from the

neutral virtues of predictability and uniformity arises from the fact

that Symeonides' effort is a modern as well as a traditional one. He

will not be content simply to try to cabin the discretion of judges, but

rather will try to maximize the appeal of his rules, incorporating

insights from the modern approaches. He will consider the interests of
the various concerned states. While cueing the rules to judicial
experience, he will afford reason a modest corrective role. His

previous codifications, which he does not here discuss, therefore
characteristically consist of multifarious, compound, multi-phase,

multi-inquiry rules, rich in content and complex in application. And

therein lies the difficulty. "Smart" rules will, in their very complexity,

undermine predictability, and with it uniformity and certainty. I
cannot refrain from remembering Walter Wheeler Cook's rather

savage remark that those who demand that choice rules give us both

uniformity and justice are like "babies crying for the moon. "82

Symeonides feels he has done the best he could, given the

intractability of the problem and the nature of codifications. His sort

of rules, he believes, will bring to the choice-of-law problem a needed

balance.

In Symeonides' thinking, a "smart" rule would recover some

part of our lost "innocence" by balancing the claims of reason, shared

norms, and material justice against the claims of "conflicts justice,'' or,

more particularly, neutrality. Whether or not one agrees with him,
Symeonides' effort to justify his work on politically neutral grounds his struggle to reclaim "innocence" - renders his work more broadly
attractive and sympathetic than any less balanced view could be.
But why should reason, and shared norms, and j ustice, have to be

"balanced" against any ideal, even neutrality? In attempting to find a

balance between justice and evenhandedness, Symeonides' rules could

risk displacement of more genuine and weighty systemic goals. As to
this, with the empiricist's fatalism, Dean Symeonides can answer

arguments from reason, shared norms, and justice itself, with an
argument from hard

fact.

He points out that in litigation today, some

rules - like it or lump it - j ust

do

tend to trump reason, shared

norms, and justice - in virtually all courts.

Symeonides gives the example of the law of the joint domicile of

the parties. He shows that today the law of a joint domicile is almost
always

applied, no

matter what the issue, no matter what the

circumstances. An exception for law that is "conduct regulating"83 is

currently making inroads on the j oint domicile, but the joint domicile

retains much of its attraction for judges. Their curious faith in the joint

82. Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws, 37 U. ILL. L. REV. 418, 420 (1943).
83. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 684-85 (N.Y. 1985).
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domicile seems to be a species of mass mistake, something like the

ineradicable common belief that the Declaration of Independence is
either in the Constitution, or is the Constitution.

There is indeed a pervasive faith in the soundness of governance of

virtually any issue by the state in which both parties reside. This must
be an accident of history.

At the start of the interest-analysis

revolution, interest analysts were naturally captivated by their newly
discovered power to identify the most obviously foolish choices of law.

These were cases in which the courts, not recognizing a false conflict,

somehow managed to apply the law of the uninterested state rather

than

the

interested

configured like

one.

Babcock

v.

These

early

Jackson,·

wrong

cases

were

cases

the case in which New York

famously declined to go on making that error.84 In these sorts of cases

both parties typically resided in the forum state, where the law favored
the plaintiff, while the injury occurred in some other state, where the

law favored the defendant. When the traditional place-of-injury rule

was applied in these cases, the interested forum - the joint domicile

of the parties - would wind up applying the non-remedial law of the

uninterested place of injury, barring suit in its own courts between its
own residents. Confronted with such unreason, academics in droves,

and with them judges, became convinced that all joint domicile cases

must be false conflicts.85

But it is simply not true that all joint domicile cases are false

conflicts. If the place of injury is the forum state, with plaintiff
favoring law, and if the parties are joint domiciliaries of another state

with defendant-favoring law, the case is a

true

conflict. In such a case

the forum, as place of injury, has legitimate governmental interests in

applying its own remedial law to benefit the nonresident plaintiff,
notwithstanding the laws of the joint domicile, and therefore has

constitutional power to do so. Of course the joint domicile always has

constitutional power too, and may wield that power in its own courts
to shield its defendant from its own plaintiff's claim. But that fact does
not strip another interested state of power in

interested forum not only can, but

should

its

courts. Moreover, the

furnish the remedy to the

nonresident plaintiff, if only to avoid a discriminatory departure from

its own law.

A more difficult problem is presented by a true conflict case in
which the forum is the j oint domicile, and has defendant-favoring law.

84.

230 N.Y.S.2d 1 14 (1962), rev'd, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963) (Fuld, J.).

85. See, for example, the first of the three "rules" announced in Neumeier v. Keuhner,
286 N.E.2d 454, 457 (N.Y. 1972) (Fuld, C.J.). There, seeking to fashion choice-of-law rules
for a class of statutory cases, Chief Judge Fuld first prescribed the law of the joint domicile
for cases in which the place of injury was elsewhere. Fuld apparently assumed that all cases
of this kind would be false conflicts.
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The injury occurred in a sister state with plaintiff-favoring law. It is

tempting to say that in a case with this configuration, a true conflict,
the forum should choose the remedial law of the place of injury. In
this way the joint domicile can vindicate its widely shared general

remedial policies. After all, if the plaintiff wins on the choice-of-law
issue she still must try to prove her case, and still can lose it. It seems

better legal process to let her have her day in court and at least air her
grievance. At the appellate level the argument for her is even stronger,

since it would require upsetting a j ury verdict in her favor to rule

against her on the dispositive choice-of-law point. Even so, I believe

that when the forum with defendant-favoring law is the j oint-domicile,

it should not flee from its own law to the law of the place of injury. To
do so would be to discriminate between two similar classes of its
resident defendants. It would be to strip the protections of its own law

only from its defendants in cases where the injury occurred out of
state, bestowing them only on defendants injured at home. It would

also be to discriminate between two classes of its resident plaintiffs,

furnishing relief only to those injured out of state, while withholding it

from those injured at home. Departures from forum law are always

problematic, not least because they tend to be discriminatory in j ust

such ways. That the forum has departed from its own law to come to

the rescue of the plaintiff does not diminish the discrimination the
departure will entail. In true conflict cases, of course, the application
of non-forum law would not be arbitrary or irrational.

But in

unprovided-for cases there can be no good reason for discriminatory
departures from forum law. Again, the forum can sometimes avoid

such

dilemmas

by frankly acknowledging that the

other

state's

remedial law is "better," and adopting the better rule as its own. In

any event, since plaintiffs generally do have the choice of forum, my

hope is that forum preference and plaintiff preference by and large
will function very similarly as a practical matter.86
VIII. AGAINST "NEUTRALITY "
But what could D avid Cavers have meant by "conflicts j ustice?"

Cavers knew that if judicial process appears to be abstract and neutral

it can satisfy even the loser of a case that he has had a fair hearing.
Robed Justice, holding aloft her scales, always wears a blindfold.

Justice must be blind. Cavers, therefore, like Symeonides, attempted
to fashion choice rules free of the bias of the forum.87 For Cavers, the

86. Cf Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution, supra note 45, at 383-84 (noting that
most American courts will choose either the law of the forum or the law that favors the
plaintiff).
87. See CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS, supra note 79 (devising "principles of
preference" to guide choices of law without reference to the biases of the forum); see also
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forum must be a neutral forum. The judges at a Cavers forum, in other
words, are freed in an interstate case from their obligation of fidelity

to their own local legislature and their own local case law. Presumably

local law has been fashioned with this background understanding, that

its force is diminished in interstate cases. Other laws and other cases
must have an equal chance of application, because Justice must be

blind.

But what must Justice be blind

to?

Presumably Justice must be

blind to the relative celebrity, wealth, political power, or influence of
the parties. But it is hard to believe that Justice must be blind to

injustice.

Justice cannot be

that

blind. That being so, I should think

neutrality and evenhandedness better served by faithful application of

the law of the forum, when the forum has reason to apply it, than by
the

intercession

of

abstract

methodological

interventions

which,

however "smart;" can only deflect judges from that necessary task and
sworn duty. To the party who has been stripped of the forum's

protections

and

who

has

lost

by

virtue

of

abstractly

chosen

governance, the process will not necessarily look innocent.
Concededly, in the true conflict case, one in which two differing
laws "apply," neither law will be arbitrary; and in the unprovided-for

case, both states' laws will. But judges should think long and hard

before turning away from their "preeminent province and duty to say

what [their own state's] law is."88 No amount of "conflicts justice" can
satisfy a resident that a court in her own state was right to deprive her

of a claim or defense it would have made available to her had her
opponent not resided elsewhere. Nor can anything explain to a

nonresident who has come to the interested place of injury for its

remedial law, why the place of injury, with its obvious governmental
interest in

applying its

remedial

law

to

her case,

nevertheless

arbitrarily withholds it from her, as if reserving a scarce commodity for
its own residents.

My differences with Symeonides obviously have something to do

with the old differences between realists and formalists. Realists are
unembarrassed by justice. The more straightforward a court is about

providing justice, the more commendable the court, as far as we

realists are concerned. But to a formalist there is something vulgar,

political - almost illicit - about justice. When justice triumphs,

formalists cannot help casting about for some overlooked neutral
principle which, if applied rigorously enough, would have prevented it.

Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1 191, 1209
(1987) (arguing that neutrality is the essential virtue of traditional territorialist approaches).
88. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.): "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
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For Dean Symeonides, as for David Cavers, justice is all very well;

but the jewel in the crown of j udicial process is neutrality.89 Neutrality
ranks highest among all neutral principles. In torts as in contracts, the
protections of due process will seem insufficient to Symeonides unless

characterized by disinterestedness and evenhandedness. Unless the

highest standards of neutrality are maintained, the judicial process,

and with it the choice-of-law process, as far as he is concerned, cannot

be "innocent." It is very hard to disagree with argument on this level
of loftiness and idealism. The formal neutrality that "conflicts justice"

can provide, at least in theory, has seemed to many to be worth

striving for. But I cannot help setting a much higher value than
Symeonides does on "material justice," which

striving for.

certainly

is worth

At the risk of shocking the reader, I venture to say that material

justice is hardly well served by superimposing upon the parties to a

tort case, in their actual situation, an ideal of neutrality which can only

be spurious. I say "spurious," because the very notion of neutrality
between the parties in an action in tort is utterly at odds with the

realities of tort litigation. Of course, after a judgment favoring the

plaintiff, nothing could be clearer than that the defendant is a
tortfeasor who has caused injury, and the plaintiff an innocent victim.

There can be no neutrality as between adjudged tortfeasor and victim.

There is no legal, or indeed moral equivalence between them. But I
would go further and point out that even before trial and j udgment
there is no legal or moral equivalence between the parties to a tort

litigation. The tort defendant, although of course entitled to every
protection

of fundamental fairness

and

due

process,

enjoys

no

presumption of innocence. Rather, in these civil cases, certainly for

purposes of deciding a dispositive conflicts question, the presumption

is that the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are true. The further
presumption, for purposes of deciding the conflicts question, is that
the complaint survives a motion to dismiss on every other ground. In

other words, for purposes of deciding the conflicts question, the
complaint is not frivolous. The complaint has merit. The defendant is

not being pushed to the wall on some trumped-up claim. It therefore

becomes necessary, if we are to think about a choice of tort law

without becoming bogged down in irrelevancies, to suppress our
emotional commitments to defendants who are being pushed to the
wall on trumped-up claims. There is much to be said for a frank

recognition that the tort defendant is a presumptive tortfeasor, that

the plaintiff presumptively has suffered a legally cognizable injury at

89. For similar views of neutrality, see supra notes 81 and 87.
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the defendant's hands, and that the law presumptively will, and

should, furnish a remedy.9()

In light of these truths, very possibly neutrality as well as

fundamental fairness would best be served by unwavering application

of the law of the forum - except, of course, for false conflicts in which

the forum is the only uninterested state.91 Forum law is the only law

that blind justice can choose and administer

with formal neutrality

precisely because it applies in all other cases, without variation,

without fear or favor, and under the direct supervision of the

legislature. This may well be the only sort of fairness to defendants,

when it comes to choosing law, that - since plaintiffs choose the

forum - will not be unfair to plaintiffs.
ENVOI

The American Choice-of-Law Revolution

of its

author's

intellectual

struggle

is a deeply sincere record

toward

solutions

of serious

problems in the conflict of laws. At the same time it is a close study of

the ways in which American courts are dealing with those problems,

and a careful consideration of what modern conflicts methods can

90. Similarly, there can be no neutrality between the parties in a contract case. There is
no equivalence in law between the parties to an action on the contract. Under the allegations
of the complaint, the contract debtor is presumptively a deadbeat, seeking to avoid her
obligations. Under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff creditor, with a
presumptively valid contract, has been left holding an empty bag. It becomes necessary, if we
are to think about a choice of contract law without becoming bogged down in irrelevancies,
to suppress our sympathy for debtors who are being pushed to the wall. The aebtor may, if
in difficult straits, seek whatever protections bankruptcy law may still afford. The contract
creditor, like the tort plaintiff, has presumptively suffered a legally cognizable injury at the
debtor's hands, and the law presumptively will, and should, provide a remedy.
91. Consider, for example, a case in which the law of the forum favors the defendant,
but the forum's only contact with the case is that the plaintiff resides there. The place of
injury, where the defendant resides, has plaintiff-favoring law. This is a false conflict,
because the place of injury, having plaintiff-favoring law, is the only interested state. See
supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. This requirement of non-forum law at the
uninterested forum in false conflict cases does not hold for unprovided-for cases. Suppose,
for example, that the defendant resides at the forum and the forum has plaintiff-favoring
law. Suppose further that the plaintiff resides at the place of injury, which has defendant
favoring law. In this latter, unprovided-for case, the forum should apply its own remedial
law. Since the place of injury is uninterested in application of its particular defense, but
shares general tort policies with the forum, the best accommodation is forum law. There
should be an exception to this rule for the unprovided-for case in which the plaintiff is
injured at home and sues there, the forum having defendant-favoring law. If forum law
seems unjust in such a case, and I think it does, the injustice arises not from the fact that the
plaintiff loses, but from the facts that, first, she is suing at home and may not be able to sue
at a more favorable forum; and, second, that, since the defendant does not reside there, the
forum has no interest in applying its special defense; but, as the place of injury, it retains its
general underlying remedial and deterrent tort policies, which would be advanced by
deference to the remedial law of the sister state. To avoid discriminatory departures from its
own law, the uninterested forum with non-remedial law should if possible "adopt" rather
than "choose" the sister-state's rule as its own. See supra note 58.
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teach us. Whether or not Dean Symeonides' own codifications will be

entirely successful at what they set out to do, his new book is entirely
successful as a replication of his struggle.

In this Review I have brought to bear the methods of interest

analysis, which Dean Symeonides understands and admires, upon
some of his own analyses. But my differences from Dean Symeonides

should not obscure the importance of his book. This is not only a most
original monograph, not only a maj or contribution to the literature,
not only a fine course in the conflict of laws, not only a treatise from
which sophisticates and novices alike can learn much, not only an

intellectual adventure, but quite simply a book one can very much
enjoy reading. One can wrestle with it, take issue with it, and yet savor

it. I had a wonderful time with it. Dean Symeonides has greatly
enriched the field with this splendid new work.

